Betting on Stability

“Returning then to the ethnoscapes with which I began, the central paradox of ethnic politics in today’s world is that primordia (whether langage or skin color or neighborhood or kinship) have become globalized. That is, sentiments, whose greatest force is in their ability to ignite intimacy into a political state and turn locality into a staging ground for identity, have become spread over vast and irregular spaces as groups move yet stay linked to one another through sophisticated media capabilities” (p. 41).
Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization

As I prepare for next semester, I find myself clicking through websites to understand more about the world. I recently switched my class schedule around, dropping a political psychology class to take an international topics class in political science; I made the change partially because I think the class will be more beneficial. I also decided to accept an offer to teach a class about understanding the American news media.

I would like to enter my classes this fall with some basic grasp of international relations, so I have sought out information about which I always felt unsure. I think one of the most difficult differences for me to understand is the difference between Sunni Muslims and Shi’ite Muslims; understanding these differences forms a basic comprehension of both the history and current political environment in the Persian Gulf region. Cursory looks so far indicate that scholars disagree about the origins; some say the differences derive from Muhammad's death and his chosen successor. Throughout the years, though, these differences have manifested deeply into the culture leading to fundamental differences, such as how both the Quran and Hadith are written and interpreted.

As I work through these differences, I also find myself drawn to stories about the problems in Iraq, caused by sectarian violence and militias. In addition to pulling apart concepts like “Sunni” and “Shi’ite”, I also find myself picking through articles to understand the term, “militia.” Often, many of these articles fail to explain the differences between the two groups; in fact, a consistent theme of the Mehdi Army is anti-American. While I do not dispute this perspective, for lack of information, I wonder how I would react if others invaded my country. Given that I am originally from Oklahoma, I know how I would feel if Texas decided to annex the state.

As I stated in my post on Kurdistan, many believe that the U.S. government is aiding PJAK, which is aligned with the PKK and is causing problems in Iran. Both Iran and Turkey have shelled and amassed troops along the Iraqi border, as part of a solution to root out what both countries believe are “insurgent” groups. But as the American news media cover the meeting among officials from Iraq, Iran, and the United States in Baghdad, the focus – at least publicly – has been on the Shi’ite militia in Iraq. The Shi’ite militia baffled me because Iraq’s current government is predominantly Shi’ite and apparently many Sunnis are not participating.

In addition to the Shi’ite militia, Iraq also has an al Qaeda problem . I have no doubt that al Qaeda found its way to Iraq; the group seems to like a good fight with Americans. The L.A. Times article quoted in my Kurdistan post indicated that many insurgents held U.S. military custody are Saudi nationals, presumably Sunni Muslims who fight for al Qaeda. Al Qaeda, however, is not considered a militia, but rather a terrorist organization. The difference between viewing the Shi’ite group as a militia and Al Qaeda is still unclear to me; I would like to investigate that further.

It was a big week for the Persian Gulf region. While the U.S. Ambassador met with Iraqi and the Iranian ambassador for a second round of talks, the U.S. government has entertained the idea of selling arms to many countries in the area, and the U.S. military has sought out local Sunni tribesmen to work in the security forces. Bush also tied Al Qaeda in Iraq to al Qaeda responsible for the September 11 attacks: “Al Qaeda in Iraq is a group funded by foreign terrorists, led largely by foreign terrorists, and loyal to a foreign leader: Osama bin Laden.” Of course, those fighting for al Qaeda in Iraq are thought to be Iraqi, though the leadership is foreign and is centered around the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region.

I have to say, though, I am not sure how al Qaeda is still funded, as I thought their sources of funding had been frozen by the U.S. government. I understand the argument that Iran is giving guns to the Shi'ite militia, but I'm still not clear on how or why the Sunnis are armed. If you put all of the information below together in an expose in an everyday weekly American newspaper, I wonder what the reaction would be.

Playing with fire
Before the meeting with Iran and the United States, Al-Maliki called on the countries to help support stability and security in Iraq. Tensions between Iran and the United States aside, the meeting’s aim was meant to seek ways to bring security and stability to Iraq, including containing Sunni militants, or al Qaeda, in the country. As I mentioned in my previous post, some believe the U.S. government is supporting PJAK, and both Turkey and Iran have had troops positioned along the Iraqi border. Following the meeting U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker said Iran has not dealt with Iraq in an effective, efficient way, though I am not too sure what this means. The U.S. contends that Iran is supporting the Shi’ite militias; the U.S. military also has two suspected Iranian terrorists in custody. The two were caught during a raid, bringing EFPs into Iraq. However, Iran denies this charge, and the Khamenei in Iran still views the United States and Israel as enemies. The meeting did yield a trilateral committee that will seek ways of bring the violence in Iraq to an end. While this meeting took place, at least three stories emerged about the U.S. military’s idea for using armed local Sunni tribesmen for security.

The idea has its roots in the experiences of the U.S. military personnel in Iraq; many of the Sunni tribesmen have expressed frustration with militias and have aided the U.S. military in several cases. While it enables Iraqis to participate in the protection of their country, the Iraqi government is cautious and concerned about the program. In fact, one major difficulty with training the security forces resides in ridding trainees of their sectarian loyalties. While the Shi’ite dominated government has felt pressure to do away with the militias, a concern arises over the focus. If the government focuses on Shi’ite militias, does it legitimize the problems caused by militant Sunni groups? The government also wants the ability to screen volunteers before they are armed, in addition to bringing these groups under government control. One Iraqi official has called it the "seed for civil war." The military emphasized it is not arming the groups, but it is authorized to give them money and ink contracts with these groups to perform certain tasks, especially the protection of “critical infrastructure.” It is a way to then pull these residents into security forces to eventually train them to use weapons and understand the “American rules of engagement.” (Oddly enough, the deck on that story was: "Irregulars to patrol own neighborhoods").

Clashes with militia are common, like the U.S. military recent run-in with the Shi’ite militia, the Medhi army, while looking for one of its commanders in Kerbala. Although the news media consistently says Kerbala is one of the most protected areas in Iraq – because it is a holy Shi’ite city – 17 militiamen were killed in the city during the clash. The Medhi army is led by Shi’ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, whom U.S. officials believe is fueling sectarian violence.

But it takes two to tango. Saudi Arabia is consistently frustrating the Bush administration; during a meeting in January in Riyadh, the Saudi government produced documents meant to debunk the legitimacy of al-Maliki in Iraq, illustrating that he has had contact with al-Sadr and that he is an Iranian agent. While U.S. officials reportedly believe the documents to be forgeries, tension between Saudi Arabia and Iraq have increased. And some believe it is NOT Iran or Syria contributing to the instability of Iraq but Saudi Arabia:

“Of course, the Saudi government has hardly masked its intention to prop up Sunni groups in Iraq and has for the past two years...the need to counterbalance the influence Iran has there.”

Despite these frustrations, the Bush administration is preparing a proposal to take to Congress; it is seeking approval of an arms package for Saudi Arabia and surrounding countries. The arms package is partially a response to Iran but to secure American influence in the area as well. In addition to selling the arms to Saudi Arabia, the United States also seeks to bolster its deal with Israel, a “significant increase over what Israel has received in the past 10 years.” Egypt would also receive a similar deal. Other countries in the area that will likely receive weaponry include: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates. Despite the U.S. government's concerns about Saudi Arabia and unlike its pressure on Iran, it has sought no public support from Saudi Arabia for the war in Iraq.

“In talks about the package, the administration has not sought specific assurances from Saudi Arabia that it would be more supportive of the American effort in Iraq as a condition of receiving the arms package, the officials said.”

Although I have not heard a great deal about increasing U.S. troops in Iraq lately, I did notice the British are talking about withdrawing their troops from Basra. Iraqis fear the lack of a major military presence in Southern Iraq, as they believe the security force is infiltrated by those competing for control of Basra's oil. One British military official described the difference between Northern Iraq and Southern Iraq as "a problem of gangsterism not sectarian violence." Eventually the Iraqis will need to stabilize their own country, as not only the British mentioned but the Iranians have argued, as well.

As American officials search for solutions, the Iraq war has created a diaspora of refugees, fleeing to neighboring countries, which is rarely mentioned in the American news media. It seems a gamble to pump guns into the region, especially since it remains unclear who bats for which team. While I have no doubt that a link between the Al Qaeda in Iraq and the Al Qaeda responsible for September 11, I also know a link exists between the Al Qaeda responsible for the September 11 attacks and the nationalities of the terrorists involved. If gambling is indeed an art based on probable outcomes, it would seem the Bush administration would place far less faith in Saudi Arabia. And even if Iran's influence had grown in the region and its support for the Shi'ite militia was painfully obvious, to provide more weaponry to a country that has illustrated a propensity for creating terrorists seems reckless, if not hypocritical. In fact, I would say about Saudi Arabia what Sean McCormack, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, said about Iran:

"They say they want strategic stability in Iraq. Well, they should start acting like it."